The Alliance for Progress, A Wisconsin Perspective
In 1965, a representative from Wisconsin stood before residents of La Ligua, a town in Central Chile, to inaugurate a neighborhood that would bear the U.S. state’s name after it was rebuilt in the wake of an earthquake. According to the speaker, the newly constructed homes at Villa Wisconsin, as it was called, would give recipients a “new lease on life” while allowing them to continue producing their internationally esteemed woolen goods, expanding opportunity in the spirit of Wisconsin’s “progressive tradition,” they stressed. It was also emphasized that these benefits were “tools” provided by the Alliance for Progress, a Kennedy administration program aimed at elevating living standards throughout the hemisphere.[1] The Wisconsin representative went on to highlight the ties that bound Chile and Wisconsin together, including an educational exchange that was underway between the University of Wisconsin (UW) and the University of Chile facilitated by the UW Land Tenure Center (LTC).[2] This celebration of a disaster relief effort appears relatively inconsequential in the history of Chile’s economic development. However, the forces that brought Villa Wisconsin into being trace back to broader United States foreign policy designed to address a political crisis in their proverbial backyard, namely the Alliance for Progress
Image of a street sign in the Villa Wisconsin neighborhood. La Ligua, Chile. 2024. Image by Alec Armon. Copyright Alec Armon, 2024.
In Chile at the time, the government was concerned about development; population growth was outpacing agricultural production, land was underutilized on a broad scale, and employment opportunities were scarce.[5] Furthermore, land and income were highly concentrated in rural Chile as 70 percent of rural households had no land or plots smaller than 10 acres and 10 percent of the population received two-thirds of all agricultural income.[6] These conditions created a fragile social balance ripe for revolt but also for reform under the Alliance for Progress. Compelled by the Alliance, the Chilean government enacted agrarian reform legislation in 1962, which would begin the process of redistributing land from large holders to peasants.[7] This solution aspired to resolve the hemisphere-wide political crisis D.C. was facing in part by abating the domestic development crisis troubling officials in Santiago.
Meanwhile, social science faculty at the University of Wisconsin finalized plans to establish a hub for the study of rural land reform at the University in 1962. Funded by USAID, the newly minted UW Land Tenure Center was enrolled in carrying out the aspects of the Alliance for Progress related to land reform and promptly opened an office for their Chilean mission in 1963 where they would conduct empirical research on agricultural issues.[8]
Image of the Villa Wisconsin community center built alongside the homes in 1965. La Ligua, Chile. 2024. Image by Alec Armon. Copyright Alec Armon, 2024.
In Chile at the time, the government was concerned about development; population growth was outpacing agricultural production, land was underutilized on a broad scale, and employment opportunities were scarce.[5] Furthermore, land and income were highly concentrated in rural Chile as 70 percent of rural households had no land or plots smaller than 10 acres and 10 percent of the population received two-thirds of all agricultural income.[6] These conditions created a fragile social balance ripe for revolt but also for reform under the Alliance for Progress. Compelled by the Alliance, the Chilean government enacted agrarian reform legislation in 1962, which would begin the process of redistributing land from large holders to peasants.[7] This solution aspired to resolve the hemisphere-wide political crisis D.C. was facing in part by abating the domestic development crisis troubling officials in Santiago.
Meanwhile, social science faculty at the University of Wisconsin finalized plans to establish a hub for the study of rural land reform at the University in 1962. Funded by USAID, the newly minted UW Land Tenure Center was enrolled in carrying out the aspects of the Alliance for Progress related to land reform and promptly opened an office for their Chilean mission in 1963 where they would conduct empirical research on agricultural issues.[8]
Those at the Land Tenure Center raised doubts early on about the transformative promise that U.S. officials advertised under the Alliance for Progress. For example, the first director of the LTC Chile office, Peter Dorner, reflected on his research findings in 1964, stating that while the prevailing class structure needed significant reworking, he “[does] not know whether the appropriate machinery exists within the Alliance [for Progress] to accomplish this” and that absent serious material improvements “the only alternative is revolution.”[9] However, in Washington, the Alliance for Progress was the revolution—but one that took place on U.S. terms. In a 1966 address to the U.S. Senate, Robert Kennedy framed the Alliance for Progress “as nothing less than a social revolution” and the U.S. government “can affect its character; [they] cannot alter its inevitability.”[10] Nonetheless, in his speech intended to reinvigorate the Alliance, Kennedy also acknowledged the speed, effort, and U.S. contribution to date were insufficient five-years on from the program’s inception.
The LTC team in Chile were similarly discouraged following their evaluation of the Alliance in 1967 but provided more pointed criticism of the U.S. government. Two LTC Chile researchers wrote to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1967 questioning the extent of the U.S. commitment to social transformation. In their report, they stated “[i]n spite of this apparently categorical support for reform, many aspects of the general U.S. posture in Latin America tend to deter reform efforts.”[11] To support this claim, for instance, the LTC staff referenced strong relations that persisted between U.S. officials, corporations, and the conservative ranks of Latin American society, which only further alienated U.S. representatives from grassroots movements. Ultimately, the two researchers from the LTC cautioned the Senate that if the Alliance was to succeed it must be amenable to working with governments who may be at times antagonistic to the U.S. They added, “the real test of our intent will come if, as may occur, such a government chooses to nationalize some land or other property owned by U.S. companies.”[12]
Image of the commemorative plaque outside the Villa Wisconsin community center which reads "this settlement was constructed thanks to the generous support of the government and people of the United States." La Ligua, Chile. 2024. Image by Alec Armon. Copyright Alec Armon, 2024.
The LTC’s advice would prove prescient as in 1970, the first Marxist president elected in the Hemisphere, Salvador Allende, took power in Chile. He quickly nationalized key sectors of the economy, such as the mining and banking industries, and in response “the same sort of press campaign which was launched against Castro [was] now being turned on Allende” by the U.S., according to LTC Chile Staff.[13] This crossed a clear red line for the U.S. government, which Robert Kennedy asserted in his Senate speech, and combined with other elements of Allende’s socialist transition, precipitated a more acute crisis for the United States at the opposite pole of their sphere of influence.[14] What followed was the infamous, CIA-backed September 11, 1973 coup that took Allende’s life and the reins of government from the ruling Popular Unity alliance, installing a military dictatorship that would last nearly two decades.
Ultimately, in attempting to solve its political crisis, the U.S. government seemed to have accelerated it. Perhaps then the Alliance for Progress was something of a Pandora’s box. In countries like Chile, its dictates like land reform opened the door for redistributive experimentation though not without resistance from the landed elite. But because these measures never led to the wholesale transformation of society—some would say by design—they only galvanized aspirations for more radical projects. Thus, the far-reaching nature of the Alliance for Progress would be its own undoing with Salvador Allende’s ascent to leadership. The researchers at the Land Tenure Center held a unique position in this particular imperial project and many similar policy initiatives globally through the 1990’s. Their knowledge influenced policy, but they maintained a certain distance from the seat of power, and their desire to tilt the social balance toward the working class in Latin America through material redistribution reads as genuine. They were neither opposed to aligning with U.S. development agencies nor were they hesitant to work closely with self-avowed Marxist governments. Their approach, while institutionalist, may have represented a more democratic alternative to U.S. foreign policy and its crisis management plan in Latin America at the time, one aimed at cooperating with states on true material redistribution and political empowerment for the masses. Unencumbered, newly elected popular leaders may have made it further in dismantling oppressive structures laid by decades of detrimental U.S. intervention.
[1] “Draft La Ligua Speech,” 1965, 81/≈59 Box 10. Land Tenure Center Archive, Madison, Wisconsin.
[2] All works cited in this piece were obtained from the Land Tenure Center Archive and Land Tenure Center Library at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
[3] Claudio Barriga, “Chile: Peasants, Politics and Land Reform,” Land Tenure Center Newsletter, Number 36 (April - June 1972), 2.
[4] U.S. State Department, “Alianza Para el Progreso: The Record of Punta del Este,” 3.
[5] David J. Stanfield, “Methodological Notes on Evaluating the Impact of Agrarian Reform in Chile’s Central Valley,” March 1973. Acc. 2013/225 Box 9. Land Tenure Center Archive, Madison, Wisconsin, 2.
[6] John F. Wood, “Chile’s New Regime Helped by UW Land Tenure Team.” The Milwaukee Journal, November 22, 1964. Acc. 81/59 Box 10. Land Tenure Center Archive, Madison, Wisconsin, 3.
[7] Joseph Thome, “Expropriation in Chile Under the Frei Agrarian Reform.” The American Journal of Comparative Law 19 (1971).
[8] Brief Notes on LTC Operations in Bolivia and Chile, January 6, 1969, Acc. 81/59, Box 10, Land Tenure Center Archive, Madison, Wisconsin.
[9] Peter Dorner, “Issues in Land Reform: The Chilean Case,” January 1964. 81/59 Box 9. Land Tenure Center Archive, Madison, Wisconsin, 35.
[10] Robert F. Kennedy, “The Alliance for Progress: Symbol and Substance,” May 9, 1966, Washington D.C.: Congressional Record, 1-4.
[11] Bill Thiesenhusen and Marion Brown, “Survey of the Alliance for Progress: Problems of Agriculture,” December 1967, 17.
[12] Thiesenhusen and Brown, “Survey,” 18.
[13] Marion R. Brown, “Part One: Allende Walks a Tightrope.” Land Tenure Center Newsletter, Number 34 (July - November 1971), 3-4.
[14] Kennedy, “Symbol and Substance,” 11.
About the Author
Alec Armon is a Master’s student in the Department of Geography at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He studies political and economic geography, focusing on policy mobilities and environmental justice with a specific emphasis on U.S. influence in Latin America. His current thesis project explores water politics and the socio-environmental impacts of desalination infrastructure in Chile. He received his BA in Latin American, Caribbean and Iberian Studies as well as International Studies from UW-Madison in 2018. Before starting graduate school, he spent three years working in community development as a project coordinator for a district planning council in Saint Paul, Minnesota.
Works Cited
Barriga, Claudio. “Chile: Peasants, Politics and Land Reform.” Land Tenure Center Newsletter, Number 36 (April - June 1972).
Marion R. Brown, “Part One: Allende Walks a Tightrope.” Land Tenure Center Newsletter, Number 34 (July - November 1971).
“Brief Notes On LTC Operations in Bolivia and Chile, January 6, 1969, Acc. 81/59, Box 10, Land Tenure Center Archive, Madison, Wisconsin.
“Draft La Ligua Speech,” 1965. 81/59 Box 10. Land Tenure Center Archive, Madison, Wisconsin.
Dorner, Peter. “Issues in Land Reform: The Chilean Case,” January 1964. 81/59 Box 9. Land Tenure Center Archive, Madison, Wisconsin.
Dorner, Peter, and William C. Thiesenhusen. “Relevant Research Programs to Be Conducted in Developing Countries,” July 1964. Acc. 81/59 Box 9. Land Tenure Center Archive, Madison, Wisconsin.
Kennedy, Robert F. “The Alliance for Progress: Symbol and Substance,” May 9, 1966. Washington D.C.: Congressional Record.
Stanfield, David J. “Methodological Notes on Evaluating the Impact of Agrarian Reform in Chile’s Central Valley,” March 1973. Acc. 2013/225 Box 9. Land Tenure Center Archive, Madison, Wisconsin.
Thiesenhusen, Bill, and Marion Brown. “Survey of the Alliance for Progress: Problems of Agriculture.” United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs. December 1967.
Thome, Joseph. “Expropriation in Chile Under the Frei Agrarian Reform.” The American Journal of Comparative Law 19 (1971).
U.S. State Department. “Alianza Para el Progreso: The Record of Punta del Este.”
Wood, John F. “Chile’s New Regime Helped by UW Land Tenure Team.” The Milwaukee
Jounral, November 22, 1964. Acc. 81/59 Box 10. Land Tenure Center Archive, Madison, Wisconsin.