Polarization as border creation
The interest in political polarization has increased in recent years as perceptions of a polarized world have become more acute (Yang et al., 2016). In part, the perception of increased polarization has been attributed to a new media ecosystem that privileges a networked distribution of information (Friedland et al., 2006), the expansion of echo chambers of like-minded individuals (Sunstein, 2007), and the availability of exemplars that paint others as extreme (Rojas, 2015).
However, beyond increased perceptions of polarization, many countries have experienced, in fact, an increased societal sorting based on political orientations (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008) and higher levels of affective political polarization. Scholarship on polarization has focused chiefly on the polarization of attitudes, that is, the increasing extremity of issue positions for any given issue within a society. More recently, an affective dimension of polarization has garnered attention, according to which polarization occurs when partisans or groups strongly dislike others who think or are perceived as different: those on the other side (Iyengar et al., 2012).
From this perspective, political polarization can be understood as the creation or consolidation of a border, one that seeks to cancel a common "we" and replace it with a notion of "us" versus "them." As polarization grows, the commonalities that allow for a sense of shared destiny are replaced by a righteous belief that the moral superiority of the ingroup cannot be tarnished by "compromise." In other words, finding common ground in a polarized society is perceived as an act of betrayal, and thus, electorates "punish" those trying to find compromises, which leads to an emptying of the political center in favor of extremes.
Of the different facets of polarization, that is, issue, perceived, and affective, the latter might be the most deleterious as it leads groups to believe in the moral and cognitive inferiority of those perceived as others. In our research that considers affective polarization over time, we find that in the last 50 years, affective polarization in Mexico and the United States has increased by 28% and 29%, respectively (Rojas & Valenzuela, 2019). These increases are based on assumptions by partisans that those in other political parties are significantly less smart, informed, and caring than those in their party.
Even more disturbing about growing political polarization is that, in the past, polarization was ameliorated by education. However, current trends suggest that higher levels of education are no longer related to increased tolerance to those who think or are different (Suk et al., 2022). On a more positive note, not all countries are experiencing increases in polarization (Boxell et al., 2022). Extant research suggests that rather than the emergence of communication technologies, including social media, which has been blamed for increased polarization, the polarization of elites is the antecedent of mass polarization (Boxell et al., 2022).
This creation of internal “borders” impinges on our collective ability to solve problems. Instead, politics becomes a zero-sum game of winners and losers in which power and violence become the preferred action coordination mechanisms. The border of polarization makes rational deliberation unattainable. Polarized citizens become less supportive of democracy and more likely to be mobilized by populist leaders who promise swift change for their ingroup, usually at the cost of the outgroup. However, for polarized citizens, this is an acceptable cost.
Nevertheless, certain authors have argued that polarization is necessary for social change and, thus, a necessary step toward achieving a more inclusive democracy (see, for example, Kreiss and McGregor, 2023). I argue that while this might be true for issue polarization, it does not seem plausible for affective polarization. Indeed, social change requires new ideas and values to infuse a system and clash with the old ideas and values they seek to replace, to ultimately form a new consensus that broadens human solidarity. However, when the polarization is affective, it becomes a border that breaks down the communal elements needed for society to achieve a new consensus, and instead, society veers towards breakdown.
What can be done to reduce affective polarization beyond elite depolarization that should translate into mass depolarization? We need to rethink democratic norms to foster depolarization without stifling social change. We need to develop communication systems that harness the power of networked communications without yielding to propaganda and disinformation. Examples to build on include Bellingcat, an open-source intelligence and online journalism initiative, and the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, an independent global network of investigative journalists, that has enabled a series of exposes including the Panama Papers.
A growing dislike of those “on the other side” has profound consequences for democracy, as polarized individuals and groups become less inclined to deliberate, less inclined to support democracy, and less inclined to trust others with different identifications. This path leads to the justification of political violence outside of the collective agreements that make universal human rights possible.
Suppose democracy is to survive the authoritarian and populist turns that are diminishing democracy worldwide. In that case, we will have to find ways to break down the borders of affective polarization while maintaining the inroads for social change.
About the Author
Hernando Rojas is Professor and Helen Firstbrook Franklin Chair in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His scholarship focuses on political communication, in particular examining: (a) the deployment of new communication technologies for social mobilization in a variety of contexts; (b) the influence of audience perceptions of media (and audience perceptions of media effects) on both public opinion and the structure of the public sphere; and (c) the conditions under which media support democratic governance.
References
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